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Abstract
This paper investigates whether and how rms competing in price with homogeneous
goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal prots using interrm bun-
dled discounts. By committing to o¤ering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a
specic brand of other di¤erentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate
consumers into distinct groups. Such brand-specic discounts help the rms relax compe-
tition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse o¤ due to higher e¤ective
prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage others market power
without excluding rivals.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a common practice for a rm to o¤er price discounts conditional on the purchase
of another (related or unrelated) rms product. Credit card companies provide price discounts
We gratefully acknowledge insightful comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee. We also thank
Jay Pil Choi, Sanghoon Lee and seminar audiences at Yonsei University and University of East Anglia for useful
comments and discussions on an earlier version of this paper. This work was supported by the National Research
Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2014-11-0395 and NRF-2013-11-1372).
ySchool of Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul 120-749, Korea; hahnjh@yonsei.ac.kr
zSchool of Economics and the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4
7TJ, U.K.; sang-hyun.kim@uea.ac.uk
1
or (pseudo- or non-monetary) rewards to customers of a specic co¤ee chain, petrol station,
telecommunication or Internet service provider, amusement park, airline, hotel chain, car
rental company, motor insurance company, and so on. Many supermarkets and grocery stores
o¤er discounts or reward points to consumers who buy from a specic petrol station, travel
agent, Internet merchant or auction site. In the U.K., consumers can collect Nectar points
every time they make a reservation via Expedia; these points can be redeemed at specic
shops, supermarkets, cinemas, amusement parks, etc. Cross-market discounts between grocery
retailers and gas stations (called fuelperks) are widely used all over the U.S., as reported by
Goic et al. [2011].
There are some notable features of such discount schemes. First, there is brand-specic
exclusivity in the sense that discounts are o¤ered only to those who buy some designated brand
of other products. Second, rms commit to discount schemes prior to choosing the headline
price for their product.1 Obviously, these two elements create interlocking relations between
the associated products. Third, such arrangements often involve di¤erent rms and products
from otherwise unrelated markets.
This paper aims to investigate the competitive e¤ect of such interrm bundled discounts.
In particular, we consider a situation where two rms competing in price with homogeneous
products (i.e., Bertrand duopolists) can o¤er a price discount to consumers who purchase
a specic brand of other di¤erentiated product. We nd that the brand specicity of the
discounts, by creating a sort of articial switching cost, segments otherwise homogeneous
consumers into two groups. In this way, the bundled discounts relax price competition between
the Bertrand duopolists and can even allow them to achieve the fully collusive outcome if
the degree of market power in the di¤erentiated market is su¢ ciently large relative to the
consumersvaluation of the homogeneous good.2 Consumers become worse o¤ due to higher
e¤ective prices. Our result reveals the collusive nature of bundled discounts involving rms
and products across seemingly unrelated markets.
1Coupons, nation-wide advertisements, and interrm contracts are probably the most popular commitment
devices, which make cross-market discounts much more rigid than those of associated products.
2This is similar to the fat cat e¤ectin Fudenberg and Tirole [1985]s animal spirits taxonomy of business
strategies.
2
Also, this paper demonstrates a way in which market power can be leveraged from one
market to another without inducing exits of competitors. This contrasts with the standard
theory on the leverage of monopoly power according to which a protable bundling or tying
usually requires exclusion of rivals.3 This observation suggests the need for caution when
extending the results of the literature on monopoly leverage to oligopolistic environments.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces a model of conditional
discounts, which includes interrm bundled discounts as a special case. We classify the discount
condition into two categories depending on whether it is exogenously given prior to rms
discount o¤ers or endogenously determined through consumer purchasing decisions. In Section
III, we examine the case of exogenous separation where Bertrand duopolists o¤er discounts
conditional on a pre-determined separation device, such as purchasing history, age, gender,
or occupation. Here, we show that the rms commit to bundled discounts large enough to
attain the fully collusive outcome. Section IV addresses the case in which the rms commit to
discounts conditional on the purchase of a specic brand of other unrelated and di¤erentiated
product, and consumers make their purchasing decisions in the di¤erentiated good market
after the bundled discounts are announced. In this case of endogenous separation, the market
outcome is partially collusive. We conclude in Section V, briey discussing the current stance
of antitrust authorities with regard to the practice of cross-market bundled discounts.
I(i). Related Literature
Probably the most closely related to the present work is the study by Gans and King
[2006]. Analyzing the Hotelling competition between two rms in each of two symmetric and
di¤erentiated markets, they show that two pairs of rms choose to jointly o¤er a discount
on their product bundle even though no rm benets from the discounts. That is, the rms
may face the situation of a prisonersdilemma if there exist some transaction costs involved in
arranging the discount scheme.4 The discount agreements reduce consumer surplus and total
welfare because consumer choice is restricted due to the bundling nature of brand specicity.5
3See, for instance, Whinston [1990], Choi and Stefanadis [2001], and Carlton and Waldman [2002].
4Brito and Vasconcelos [2013] extend Gans and Kings work to the case of vertical di¤erentiation and nd
that only high quality sellers obtain higher prots relative to the no-bundling benchmark.
5Matutes and Regibeau [1992] derive somewhat similar results in the context of system markets consisting
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In contrast, our model presents a case of jointly protable and even fully collusive bundled
discounts under asymmetric oligopolies. Also, we shows that rms with no market power can
achieve supernormal prots by leveraging other unrelated rmsmarket power using unilateral
(rather than bilateral) discount schemes. In this respect, our result shares some similarity
with the recent work of Katz and Hermalin [2013], who show that relatively undi¤erentiated
platforms can increase joint prots using exclusive contracts with relatively di¤erentiated ap-
plications. Our analysis, however, di¤ers from their model in the following aspects. First,
the rms in our model use pricing schemes that are more exible and easily enforceable than
the exclusive contractual arrangements considered by Katz and Hermalin. Second, we con-
sider unilateral discount schemes across unrelated markets rather than bilateral arrangements
between suppliers of perfectly complementary goods in system markets.
The present work is also related to the literature of endogenous switching costs. Baner-
jee and Summers [1987] show that, in a two-period Bertrand competition model, rms can
earn monopoly prots by o¤ering discounts to repeat buyers in period one. Repeat-purchase
discounts induce consumer loyalty due to switching costs, which enables the rms to segment
the market and charge higher prices in period two. Moreover, the rms resist price reduction
in period one in order to insure a large install base of the rival in the later period. Caminal
and Matutes [1990] examine two distinct types of loyalty-inducing strategies in di¤erentiated
product markets and show that equilibrium prots decrease with price commitment but in-
crease with discount commitment. Also related in this line of research are the recent works on
behavior-based price discrimination, which study intertemporal discriminatory pricing based
on purchase histories.6 Even though the basic logic is similar, our paper is distinct from these
studies in several aspects. First, we show that the collusive e¤ect of discounts operates in a
of two fully integrated suppliers of complementary components. They show that the rms choose to o¤er
discounts to consumers who purchase all components from the same supplier, even though the rms would be
better o¤ if they could agree not to o¤er bundled discounts. Extending their model to more general preferences,
Thanassoulis [2007] shows that the competitive e¤ect of mixed bundling crucially depends on whether buyers
tastes are rm-specic or product-specic.
6See Villas-Boas [1999] and Fudenberg and Tirole [2000]. Fudenberg and Villas-Boas [2007] provide an
excellent survey on this topic.
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one-shot framework as opposed to repeat-purchases. Second, consumer loyalty in our model is
created by interrm relations across di¤erent markets rather than intertemporal consumption
relations of the same good. Third, we focus on the leverage of market power from one market
to another.
Some relevant works also exist in the bundling literature. Chen [1997] shows that a multi-
product rm producing a primary good in a duopoly market and another good under perfectly
competitive conditions may wish to bundle its products in order to di¤erentiate otherwise
identical products and relax price competition in the duopoly market. Spector [2007], on the
other hand, points out the possibility that a monopoly supplier of a primary good ties its
monopoly good to a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market for the purpose
of facilitating collusion in the oligopoly market. In both papers, bundling or tying is pursued
by a multiproduct rm with its own products, while bundled discounts in our model involve
independent rms in unrelated markets. More recently, Armstrong [2013] has shown that
independent sellers of two substitutes may wish to o¤er interrm discounts in order to relax
competition when they can coordinate on the size of the discount. Although this is quite sim-
ilar to the nding of our analysis, his result is derived in a setting where two competitors in a
single market jointly o¤er bundled products to customers, whereas we consider two unrelated
oligopolies in which bundled discounts are o¤ered across the markets.
II. MODEL
Consider a market where two rms, denoted A1 and A2, compete in price with homogeneous
good A. There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1 with unit demands. Let vA denote the
reservation price for the product, which is common to all consumers.7 For simplicity, the cost
of production is assumed to be zero for both rms.
A crucial feature of the model is that individual rms can independently pre-commit, before
announcing their headline price, to a discount that is available only to those who satisfy some
pre-specied conditions.8 For instance, the rms can distribute coupons that discount a xed
7Allowing heterogeneous consumer preferences for good A would not change the qualitative results.
8Here we consider the case of additive discounts, deducting an absolute amount of money from the headline
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amount o¤ the headline price for consumers who present evidence of purchases of a specic
brand of a product. Or they can o¤er other non-monetary benets, such as free gifts, instead
of price discounts.
Although our analysis is focused on discounts schemes arranged between otherwise unre-
lated rms, our model can be interpreted in a more exible manner. In general, the conditions
for discounts can take various forms; they can be intrinsic consumer characteristics such as
age, gender, occupation, location of residence, etc., or they can be present or past consumer
behavior such as the purchase of a particular brand of another (related or unrelated) product
or a veriable purchasing history. In any case, conditional discounts usually allow rms to
separate consumers who are otherwise identical into di¤erent groups.
Exogenous separation, which is analyzed in Section III, is the case where the condition
for discounts is permanently xed or exogenously given before rms A1 and A2 take any
action and is therefore totally independent of the events in market A. Discounts conditional
on invariant consumer characteristics or purchasing history of a particular good or service
correspond to this case.9 On the other hand, endogenous separation describes a situation where
the condition for discounts is determined within the model according to consumer purchasing
behavior. More specically, as in the game considered in Section IV, rms can commit to a
discount conditional on the purchase of a particular brand of another good, and consumers
make purchasing decisions on the two products by simultaneously considering the conditional
discounts.
Attention is restricted to the case where the homogeneous goods suppliers (rms A1 and
A2) individually tie their discount (di) only to a single group of consumers (in the exogenous
separation case) or a single brand of other product (in the endogenous separation case) and
coordinate their discount schemes so that the two discounts are conditioned on di¤erent groups
of consumers or brands. More generally, individual rm i can o¤er discriminatory discounts
(dij) to both groups, where j(= 1; 2) denotes the consumer groups. However, given that
price. However, the analysis can be easily extended to other cases where discounts are in the form of proportional
discounts.
9Notice that this di¤ers from the standard third-degree price discrimination in that all consumers here have
identical preferences for the good.
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consumer purchasing decisions are made based on relative e¤ective prices (i.e., nominal prices
less discounts), it is without loss of generality to normalize the smaller discount to zero unless
the rms intend to practice intragroup second-degree price discrimination.10 In fact, casual
observations in the real world market seem quite compatible with our assumption of single
group discounts.11
III. EXOGENOUS SEPARATION
Consumers are exogenously divided into two groups B1 and B2 with proportions  and
1   , respectively, where  2 (0; 1). The two groups may represent people living in the
southern and northern districts of a town, or installed bases of two brands of a particular
product. Firms A1 and A2 independently commit to discounts conditional on group identity.
Let piA denote the headline price of rm Ai.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The rms in market A independently and simultaneously pre-commit to conditional
discounts.
2. A sequential pricing game between A1 and A2 follows, where the price leader and follower
are exogenously determined.
3. Consumers make purchasing decisions, given the prices and discounts set in the early
stages.
We model the second-stage pricing game as sequential moves in order to guarantee the
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The interlocking relations induced by condi-
tional discounts create endogenous switching costs, and it is well known that, with switching
costs, pure-strategy equilibria may not exist in simultaneous pricing games. We avoid this
10Formally, we can redene the real discount as di = jdi1   di2j and the corresponding headline price as
piA = p
i
A  minfdi2; di2g. Then the model is identical to the one analyzed in the next section.
11For example, two dominant mobile telecommunication companies in South Korea (SK Telecom and Korea
Telecom) provide membership services that give discounts only to consumers who buy from a single designated
brand of major bakery.
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technical issue by assuming sequential moves in the pricing game, as in Banerjee and Summers
[1987].12 The identities of the price leader and follower are known to the rms before they
commit to discounts. One may consider the case where the order of pricing is revealed only at
the beginning of the second stage, which however does not a¤ect our results, as will be shown
below.
Note that the pricing game in this section is formally identical to the second-period pricing
game in Banerjee and Summer repeat purchases model. This shows that conditional discount
schemes are closely related to the intertemporal loyalty-inducing program analyzed by Banerjee
and Summers [1987]. Our analysis is, however, more general than theirs in that we consider
generic proportions of groups or installed bases ( 2 (0; 1)), while Banerjee and Summers solve
for only two special cases of  = 1; 1=2.
We solve for subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game using backward induction.
Let us rst consider the sequential pricing game in the second stage. Assume without loss of
generality that, in the rst stage, the price leader (denoted l) has promised to o¤er discount
dl to group B1 consumers, and the follower (denoted f) committed to discount df to those in
group B2. Then, the followers demand is
Df (pl; pf ; dl; df ) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if pf  pl   dl
1   if pl   dl < pf  pl + df
0 if pl < pf   df
;
where pl and pf denote the headline prices of the leader and the follower, respectively. The
leaders demand is given by Dl = 1   Df . With the conditional discounts, consumers will
choose to buy from the rm o¤ering a discount as long as the di¤erence between the two
headline prices does not exceed the amount of discount. In this case, the rms share the
market according to the pre-determined proportions of two groups. When the di¤erence in
the headline prices is su¢ ciently large, on the other hand, the rm with a lower e¤ective price
12See Banerjee and Summers [1987] for more detail on this issue in the context of intertemporal loyalty-
inducing discounts. The qualitative result would remain the same even if we assume simultaneous moves.
In that case, the prices would be above the marginal cost with positive probability at the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
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captures the entire market. Obviously, the e¤ective prices (headline prices less discounts)
cannot be greater than the reservation value vA in equilibrium, i.e., pi   di  vA, i = l; f .
The followers prot is given by
f (pl; pf ; dl; df ) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  )(pf   df ) + pf if pf  pl   dl
(1  )(pf   df ) if pl   dl < pf  pl + df
0 if pl < pf   df
;
which is piecewise continuous with discontinuities at pf = pl   dl and pf = pl + df . Note that
the prot function is strictly increasing in pf for pf  pl   df , drops to (1   )(pf   df ) at
pf = pl dl, and then increases again. Thus, the followers problem is simplied to determining
whether to share the market with the leader by setting pSf = min fpl; vAg + df or to capture
the entire market by setting pMf = pl dl. So, we can write the maximum prot of the follower
as
f (pl; dl; df ) = max

(1  )(pSf   df ); (1  )(pMf   df ) + pMf
	
= max f(1  )min fpl; vAg ; pl   dl   (1  )dfg :
We can easily see that the follower will corner the market if the leaders e¤ective price is
su¢ ciently high and will share the market otherwise.
Let us now consider the leaders pricing problem. Obviously, the leader will choose a price
that induces the follower to later choose to share the market (the followers market-cornering
means zero prots for the leader), i.e.,
(1  )min fpl; vAg  pl   dl   (1  )df : (1)
Given that the leaders market share is xed at , the leaders problem is to select the highest
price satisfying condition (1). The largest possible price that the leader can charge is given by
pl   dl = vA. Substituting pl = vA + dl and rearranging terms, condition (1) reduces to
df  
1  vA: (2)
So, if df is large enough to satisfy (2) the leader can extract the entire surplus vA from the
consumers in group B1. Otherwise (i.e., for a a small df ), the leader needs to lower the price
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in order to induce the follower to later choose to share the market. In this case, the leader will
set the price that makes the follower indi¤erent between market sharing and cornering, i.e.,
(1  )min fpl; vAg = pl   dl   (1  )df ;
and, therefore, the leaders optimal price is given by
pl =
8<:
dl+(1 )df
 if
dl+(1 )df
  vA
dl + (1  )(vA + df ) if dl+(1 )df > vA
:
Thus, given discounts dl and df the second-stage equilibrium prots of the two rms are
l(dl; df ) =
8<: vA if df  1 vA(pl   dl) if df < 1 vA ;
f (dl; df ) =
8<: (1  )vA if df  1 vA(1  )min fpl ; vAg if df < 1 vA :
Let us now consider the rst-stage discount game. Note that the followers prot is weakly
increasing in df and reaches its maximum for df  1 vA. Thus the follower will optimally
pre-commit to a su¢ ciently large discount df  1 vA. The leaders prot, which is weakly
increasing in dl and df , is also maximal for df  1 vA. In equilibrium, the leader will choose
discount and headline prices such that pl = vA+dl. The market is divided into two exogenously
separated groups in equilibrium. The rms achieve the fully collusive outcome, extracting the
whole consumer surplus. Note that this result holds irrespective of the mass distribution of the
two groups, provided that consumers are separated into two distinct groups, i.e.,  2 (0; 1).
While  does not a¤ect the e¤ective price in equilibrium, it does a¤ect the size of discounts.
The minimum discount that sustains this arrangement increases as  increases. Intuitively,
the followers incentive to capture the entire market gets stronger as  increases. Hence, in
order to ensure the collusive outcome, the follower needs to commit to a larger discount for a
larger . The discussion so far is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. With two exogenously separated groups of consumers, the homogeneous
goods suppliers can achieve the fully collusive outcome by committing to su¢ ciently large
conditional discounts. The rms extract the whole consumer surplus, and each rms prot
10
is proportional to the size of the group on which its discount is conditioned, i.e., l + f =
vA + (1  )vA = vA.
This result shows that price discounts conditional on exogenous segmentation can be used
to facilitate collusion among competitors by letting them mutually forbear intruding into
each others market as in multimarket contact situations.13 It is noteworthy, however, that
conditional discounts are more exible in their applicability in the sense that they can exploit
not only geographical di¤erentiation, but also demographic characteristics of consumers and
their purchasing histories. Also related is the work of Roy [2000], who demonstrates that
competing rms can achieve a collusive outcome by targeting advertisement toward mutually
exclusive consumer groups.
Remark 1. In order to correctly evaluate the competitive e¤ect of conditional discounts,
we need to clarify the benchmark equilibrium without discounts. Recall that there are in-
nitely many equilibria under sequential pricing in the absence of conditional discounts, where
the leader sets a price greater than the marginal cost, and the follower makes all sales by
slightly undercutting the leaders price or charging the monopoly price. However, there are
many reasons why the most reasonable equilibrium should be the static Bertrand outcome
with marginal cost pricing and zero prots for both rms. First, the leader may prefer the
equilibrium with positive sales to those with no sales at all (although zero prots are obtained
in any case) because continuing production and operation is vital for maintaining customer re-
lations for future businesses. Second, the subgame perfect equilibrium would involve marginal
cost pricing and zero prots if there is a chance that the leader has slight cost advantages over
the follower. Suppose that the followers marginal cost is c and the leaders marginal cost is c
with a large probability and c " with a small probability. Then, the followers best response is
to undercut the leaders price as long as it is larger than c and to set c otherwise. Anticipating
this, the leader will optimally choose its price to be equal to c.14 Third, the leader would want
13For discussions of mutual forbearance in multimarket competition, see e.g., Bernheim and Whinston [1990]
and Evans and Kessides [1994].
14The leader would not choose a price less than c given the small probability that its marginal cost is less
than c.
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to avoid supernormal prots to the follower, who is a potential rival in R&D races for other
related products or technologies.
IV. ENDOGENOUS SEPARATION
Now suppose that there is no exogenous separation device in the market. Instead there is
another product B that is produced by two independent rms B1 and B2. Consumers have
unit demands for product B. Firms A1 and A2 can individually pre-commit to a price discount
for consumers who purchase a specic brand of product B together with their own product.
Consumer preferences for products A and B are independent. We assume that rms B1 and
B2 do not o¤er their own brand-specic discounts, and focus on the strategic role of unilateral
brand-specic discounts in leveraging market power across two otherwise unrelated markets.15
Here we consider the case where consumer preferences for brands B1 and B2 are horizontally
di¤erentiated à la Hotelling.16 So, consumers can be viewed as uniformly distributed on the
unit interval [0; 1]. A particular consumers location on this line is denoted by x, with rms
B1 and B2 being located at 0 and 1, respectively. If a consumer located at x purchases from
Bj , she gains the net utility of vB   pjB   t jx  bxj j with bxj 2 f0; 1g; j = 1; 2, where vB is
the consumers gross value of product B, pjB is the price charged by rm Bj , and t jx  bxj j
measures the disutility of the consumer due to the di¤erence between the purchased product
and her ideal product. It is assumed that the production cost is zero for both rms, and that
vB is su¢ ciently large so that, in equilibrium, all consumers buy one unit of product B.
Then, the net utility gained by a consumer located at x when purchasing product A from
Ai and product B from Bj is given by
vA  
 
piA  Dij

+
h
vB   t jx  bxj j   pjBi ; i; j = 1; 2;
where Dij = di if Ai is connected to Bj via brand-specic discounts, and Dij = 0 otherwise.
Obviously, equilibrium e¤ective prices for product A cannot be larger than vA for all i and
15One may model this as two rms in di¤erent markets forming an alliance and cooperatively setting bundled
discounts for consumers who buy from them, as in Gans and King [2006]
16The analysis, however, would be easily extended to other duopoly models in which rms exercise non-trivial
market power.
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j. We initially consider the case where the degree of product di¤erentiation in market B
(measured by t) is small in comparison with vA so that the rms in market A can achieve only
a partially collusive outcome (i.e., the market power to be leveraged is not strong enough for
rms in market A to achieve full collusion). Specically, we assume that vA  3t=2. Later
in subsection IV(iv), we discuss other cases where the product di¤erentiation in market B is
su¢ ciently strong so that full collusion is attained in market A via brand-specic discounts.
The timing of the game is the same as in the exogenous separation case, except that there
exists another stage (stage 0) in which the rms in market B set their prices independently
and simultaneously before the rms in market A set conditional discounts. We assume that
rms B1 and B2 choose prices, not knowing who will be the price leader/follower in market A.
So, in the eyes of the rms in market B the price leader and follower in market A are selected
randomly. At the end of this section, we discuss how the results would change if the rms in
market B know the identity of the price leader/follower in market A.
We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. Note that, in the
absence of brand-specic discounts, the two markets are completely independent, giving rise
to sequential Bertrand competition in market A and standard Hotelling competition in market
B. As before, we assume that marginal cost pricing prevails in the sequential pricing game in
market A.
IV(i). Pricing of the rms in market B
Here we derive some preliminary results regarding the pricing equilibrium in market B,
which will be useful in solving the entire game. The following lemma says that, given in-
complete information about the identity of the price leader/follower and the random nature
of pricing sequence in market A, the pricing behavior of the rms in market B is neutral to
brand-specic discounts and pricing decisions of rms A1 and A2.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the rms in market B have uniform beliefs about the identities of
the price leader and follower in market A and they are risk-neutral. Then, in equilibrium, the
rms behave as duopolists in the standard Hotelling model, each setting the symmetric price
p1B = p
2
B = t and earning expected prots of t=2.
13
See Appendix for proof.
It is as if the rms in market B are unaware of such discounts or even the presence of
product A. Hence, rms B1 and B2 behave independently of the prices and discounts set by
the rms in market A. Of course, as will be shown below, brand-specic discounts may inict
prot losses to individual rms in market B ex post. However, these losses, if they exist, could
be compensated via monetary transfer (e.g., side payments) from the corresponding rm in
market A. Given this neutrality result, we now proceed to analyze the remaining stages of the
game.
IV(ii). Second-stage pricing game in market A
Again we assume that, in the rst stage, the price leader has committed to a discount dl
for consumers purchasing from rm B1 and the follower has committed to a discount df for
those purchasing from rm B2. Note that, however, the condition for discounts is endogenized
by consumerspurchasing decisions in market B, unlike in the previous exogenous separation
case. Hence, consumers product choices are interrelated over two unrelated markets via
brand-specic discounts.
IV(ii)(a). Followers optimal pricing Given p1B = p
2
B = t in market B at stage 0, the
e¤ective prices (including transportation costs) faced by a consumer located at x 2 [0; 1] for
the two products are:
P =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
t+ tx+ pl   dl; when buying from B1 and l
t+ tx+ pf ; when buying from B1 and f
t+ t(1  x) + pl; when buying from B2 and l
t+ t(1  x) + pf   df ; when buying from B2 and f
:
The followers demand function is then given by17
Df (pl; pf ; dl; df ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if pf > pl + df +min ft  dl; 0g
1
2 +
(pl dl) (pf df )
2t
if pl   dl +max fdf   t; 0g  pf
 pl + df +min ft  dl; 0g
1 if pf < pl   dl +max fdf   t; 0g
:
17Here we assume that consumers, when they are indi¤erent, purchase the product with a discount.
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For instance, the followers demand is zero if his e¤ective price is higher than that of the
leader for all consumers (pf   df > pl + t   dl) or if his e¤ective price is so high that even
those purchasing from B2 prefer the leaders product to the followers (pf   df > pl), i.e., if
pf > pl + df + min ft  dl; 0g. The followers demands for other cases are derived similarly.
Note that the demand is discontinuous at pl + df if df < t and at pl   dl if dl < t.
The follower has two options in responding to the leaders price. One is to share the
market with the leader by setting a moderate price. The other is to corner the market by
setting a su¢ ciently low price. Which tactic is more protable depends on the sizes of the
two discounts and the leaders price. Intuitively, the follower chooses to corner the market
for small discounts. For large discounts, however, cornering the market is too costly, and the
follower nds it more protable to share the market with the leader. Below, we compare the
followers maximal prots under the two regimes.
The followers problem under market sharing is dened as follows:
max
pf
: (pf   df )

1
2
+
(pl   dl)  (pf   df )
2t

:
The rst-order condition gives a unique solution pSf = df +
t+pl dl
2 . In order for this price to
yield market sharing, it is required that pl   dl +max fdf   t; 0g  df + t+pl dl2 5 pl + df +
min ft  dl; 0g, which leads to the condition jt  dlj  pl  t+dl+2min fdf ; tg. If pl < jt  dlj,
we have a corner solution with pSf = pl + df +min ft  dl; 0g, where the followers demand is
Df =
1
2   dl+minft dl;0g2t . Then, the followers optimal price and prot under market sharing
are respectively given by
pSf =
8<: df +
t+pl dl
2 ; if jt  dlj  pl  t+ dl + 2min fdf ; tg
pl + df +min ft  dl; 0g ; if pl < jt  dlj
(3)
Sf =
8<:
(t+pl dl)2
8t ; if jt  dlj  pl  t+ dl + 2min fdf ; tg
[pl+minft dl;0g]maxft dl;0g
2t ; if pl < jt  dlj
: (4)
On the other hand, if pl > t+ dl + 2min fdf ; tg, the follower optimally corners the market
A by setting
pMf = pl   dl +max fdf   t; 0g
15
and earns prots of
Mf = pl   dl  minft; dfg:
The timeline of the game indicates that the price leader will not select a price leading to
monopolization of market A by the follower. Since such a strategy will never be supported
as a perfect equilibrium of the whole game, we can restrict our attention to subgames where
both rms are active in market A. Suppose the follower chooses to share the market by setting
price pSf as in (3). Then, the leaders prot is given by
l = (pl   dl)
"
1
2
  (pl   dl)  (p
S
f   df )
2t
#
=
(pl   dl)
4t
[3t max fpl   dl; t  2dl   2minft  dl; 0gg] ;
which is continuous in pl. Note that, for pl   dl  t  2dl   2minft  dl; 0g (i.e. pl  jt  dlj),
the prot function is monotonically increasing in pl, which together with the continuity implies
that the prot function is maximized at pl = pl  jt  dlj, where pl is characterized as below.
This implies that the leaders optimal price will be greater than or equal to jt  dlj. Recall
that the follower always corners the market for pl > t + dl + 2min fdf ; tg. So, we restrict
out attention to the case where jt  dlj 5 pl 5 t + dl + 2min fdf ; tg, for which the relevant
follower prot is given by Sf =
(t+pl dl)2
8t . Later, we will show that (p

l ; p
S
f ) indeed constitutes
an equilibrium.
Then, comparing the followers prots under the two regimes, Sf and 
M
f , leads to the
following result.
Lemma 2. Given jt  dlj 5 pl 5 t+dl+2min fdf ; tg, the follower prefers market sharing if
df  t (5)
or
df  t and pl   dl  3t 
q
8t(t  df ); (6)
and prefers market cornering otherwise.
See Appendix for proof.
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IV(ii)(b). Leaders optimal pricing
The leaders problem is
max
pl
:
(pl   dl)
4t
[3t max fpl   dl; t  2dl   2minft  dl; 0gg]
subject to Sf (dl; df )  Mf (dl; df ). Note that pl   dl > t  2dl   2minft  dl; 0g must be true
given pl  jt  dlj at equilibrium.
If we ignore the constraint for the moment, the solution of the problem is given by
pl =
3
2
t+ dl:
Then, from the previous analysis, we obtain the following:
pf = p
S
f =
5
4
t+ df ;
l =
9
16
t;
f = 
S
f =
25
32
t:
Note that the condition jt  dlj  pl is satised at pl = 32 t+dl (jt  dlj  pl = 3t=2+dl).18
Then, the constraint Sf (dl; df )  Mf (dl; df ) reduces to the condition for market sharing in
Lemma 2, which are satised at pl =
3
2 t+ dl if
df  23t
32
: (7)
So, the prices (pl ; p

f ) indeed constitute an equilibrium of the second-stage pricing game if
the discount set by the follower is large enough (precisely if df  23t=32), irrespective of the
leaders discount. We do not explicitly characterize other possible equilibria of this pricing
game for di¤erent values of dl and df since the corresponding prots of the leader and follower
cannot be greater than l and 

f , respectively, as will be shown later. Note that, given the
equilibrium prices, consumers are divided into two groups at the indi¤erent type x = 3=8.
IV(iii). First-stage discounting game
Let us now consider the rst-stage discounting game where rms A1 and A2 independently
and simultaneously choose their brand-specic discounts. The following proposition establishes
18The condition pl 5 t+ dl + 2min fdf ; tg is also satised under condition (7).
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that the rms in market A can use brand-specic discounts to achieve (partially) collusive
outcomes, making strictly positive prots at equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the price follower commits to a brand-
specic discount larger than or equal to 23t=32 (i.e., df > 23t=32,), the follower earns prots
of f = 25t=32 and the leader earns prots of 

l = 9t=16.
19
See Appendix for proof.
We can show that l and 

f are indeed the maximal prots obtainable by the leader
and the follower, respectively, for all values of dl and df . With a large discount, the follower
nds it very costly to cut prices for market cornering since it has to set its headline price
su¢ ciently low in order to capture all consumers, including those who purchase from rm B2
and are therefore entitled to the discount o¤ered by the leader. O¤ering a large discount is
a commitment to less aggressive pricing in the later stage, which in turn induces the rivals
friendly behavior.
Consumers become worse o¤ with brand-specic discounts since they face higher e¤ective
prices in market A compared with the benchmark equilibrium with the standard Bertrand
outcome:
pf   df =
5
4
t > 0 and pl   dl =
3t
2
> 0:
Social welfare is also lower under brand-specic discounts because consumer gross utilities de-
crease due to the increase in transportation costs. Note that consumers with x 2 [3=8; 1=2] end
up buying their less preferred brand of product B, bearing larger transportation costs com-
pared with the benchmark case where market B is symmetrically split.20 Note that the adverse
welfare e¤ect would be more serious if we allow for elastic demands and partial participation.
19 If the price leader and follower are selected randomly, each rms problem is to choose a discount to maximize
expected prots l=2+f=2 or, equivalently, joint prots (l+f ). It is immediate from the previous analysis
that rms A1 and A2 will both commit to brand-specic discounts di  23t=32 in order to obtain the maximal
joint prot (43t=32), each expecting one-half of it.
20Note that, however, this is an artifact caused by sequential pricing in the second stage and would disappear
in simultaneous pricing.
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The result above shows that brand-specic discounts can be used as a collusion-facilitating
device. However, given that vA  3t=2, the equilibrium prices fall short of the full collusive
price. That is, the collusive e¤ect of brand-specic discounts is limited by the degree of
monopoly power in the market to which discounts are tied. This contrasts with the exogenous
separation case where the rms in market A achieve the fully collusive outcome, extracting
the whole consumer surplus.
IV(iv). Full collusion with large t
Suppose that t is large in comparison with vA (i.e. vA < 3t=2). Then, the previously
derived e¤ective prices 3t=2 and 5t=4 are not feasible (consumers would not buy a unit of
product A at these prices), and the constraint that pi   di  vA is binding for some i.
It turns out that including the price ceiling does not drastically alter the incentives for pre-
commitment to price discounts. Intuitively, since the followers prot is (weakly) increasing
in the leaders e¤ective price, the follower still wishes to commit to sharing the market by
choosing a high discount. Consequently, the cross-market bundled discounts prevail even with
the price ceiling.
Proposition 3. When vA 2 [t; 3t=2], the price follower commits to a brand-specic discount
greater than or equal to t (3t vA)2=8t, and the follower and leader earn prots of (vA + t)2 =8t
and vA(3t   vA)=4t, respectively. When vA < t, the follower commits to a discount greater
than or equal to vA=2, and both rms earn vA=2 (i.e., half of the fully collusive joint prot).
See Appendix for proof.
Notice that, if the degree of product di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently large compared to vA
(i.e., vA < t), the rms can attain the fully collusive outcome as in the exogenous separation
case analyzed in Section III. Thus, this proposition clearly shows that bundled discounts for
unrelated products can be a blatant collusion device, and the practice can be abused by rms
as a disguise to antitrust investigations.
Remark 2. We made a simplifying assumption that the rms in the di¤erentiated goods
market do not know who will be the price leader in the homogenous goods market. Here
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we briey discuss whether our main result would remain valid even without the assumption.
Suppose the identities of the price leader/follower in market A are known to the rms in
market B. The simplest setup we can imagine is the case where two alliances are exogenously
formed with respect to brand-specic discounts. Then the model is the same as before, except
that the prices set by the rms in market B are now asymmetric. The analysis would be
more complicated due to the strategic pricing behavior of the rms in market B. However,
the previous analysis of exogenous separation indicates that, no matter how the market is
separated, the rms in market A would have incentive to o¤er large discounts in order to make
supernormal prots at equilibrium. So, without solving for the analytic solution, we can see
that the qualitative result would continue to hold even if the identities of the price leader
and follower in market A are known to the rms in market B. The only di¤erence is that
the partner rm of the leader would decrease its price (compared with the symmetric case) in
order to preemptively respond to the followers later undercutting of the leaders price, and
the opposite holds for the partner rm of the follower. (This can be veried by inspecting the
reaction functions of the rms in market B.) Obviously, however, the price leader in market
A will need to compensate (maybe through side payments) its partner rm in market B.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the competitive e¤ect of interrm bundled discounts, the marketing
practice of o¤ering discounts conditional on the purchase of a particular brand of other (related
or unrelated) products. The central nding is that rms with no (or less) market power can
use the interrm bundled discount to leverage market power of other unrelated rms.
We have shown that interrm bundled discounts, by creating interlocking relations between
otherwise unrelated products, act to relax price competition. Furthermore, using the discount
scheme, rms with no market power may achieve the fully collusive outcome when the di¤erence
in market power between the associated markets is su¢ ciently large. Obviously, consumers
are worse o¤ since the e¤ective prices for the goods increase in the presence of such discount
schemes.
Our analysis provides important implications for public policy toward bundled discounts.
20
Specically, the above results suggest that competition policy needs to address the collusive
e¤ect of such discount practices, especially when the market tied by discounts is subject to a
high degree of market power. However, thus far antitrust case involving bundled discounts has
been rare. An exception is the case of the shopper docketscheme tying petrol discounts with
grocery purchases, which has been reviewed by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission since 2004.21 The ACCC has recently accepted undertakings from two major
supermarket chains to voluntarily limit the bundled discounts to a maximum of 4 cents per
liter of fuel.22 The chairman of the ACCC warned that bundled discounts "could have long-
term e¤ects on the structure of the retail fuel markets, as well as the short-term e¤ects of
increasing general pump prices," which is in line with the analysis of this paper.23
It is fortunate that bundled discount schemes are getting more attention in the antitrust
arena. Gans and King [2006] argue that bundled discounts of unrelated products should be
regarded with suspicion. Organizations such as Master Grocers Australia [2012] insist that the
practice remains anti-competitive in e¤ect and is not in the public interest, and that ACCC
should revoke their decision. Also, the Korea Fair Trade Commission recently announced that
it will introduce credit cards that o¤er reward points for all, as opposed to particular, petrol
stations in order to discourage potentially anti-competitive bundled discounts between credit
card companies and petrol stations.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
21The main shopper docket schemes under review relate to discounts o¤ered by a subsidiary of Coles Myer
Ltd (Coles), resulting from an alliance between Coles and The Shell Company of Australia Ltd (Shell), and
by Woolworths Limited (Woolworths) and one of its subsidiaries, Australian Independent Retailers Pty Ltd
(AIR).according to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2004, p.2]
22 In April 2014, the Federal Court found one of the supermarkets, Woolworths, to have breached this under-
taking.
23The o¢ cial media release is available in: www.accc.gov.au/media-release/coles-and-woolworths-undertake-
to-cease-supermarket-subsidised-fuel-discounts
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In general, equilibrium market shares and prots of rms B1 and B2 depend on not only
their own prices, but also the prices and brand-specic discounts set by the rms in market
A. However, since rms B1 and B2 do not know which rm in market A it will be connected
to via brand-specic discounts and who will later be the price leader in market A, they do
not know in advance how brand-specic discounts will a¤ect their prots. Nevertheless, we
know that, given that all consumers buy one unit of product B, if one rm gains  in terms of
market share from brand-specic discounts, the other rm will lose exactly the same amount.
Thus, we can write rm B1s market share as
x+ =
t  p1B + p2B
2t
+ 
 
piA; di

if it benets from brand-specic discounts and as
x  =
t  p1B + p2B
2t
    piA; di
if it loses from brand-specic discounts, where 
 
piA; di

denotes the sole e¤ect of brand-specic
discounts on market shares. Firm B2s market share will be then 1 x+ or 1 x , respectively.
Given the uniform belief about the identity of the price leader in market A, the risk-neutral
rms B1 and B2 will choose prices in order to maximize their expected prots:
E[1B] = p
1
B
x+ + x 
2
= p1B
t  p1B + p2B
2t
;
E[2B] = p
2
B
(1  x+) + (1  x )
2
= p2B
t  pB2 + p1B
2t
;
which are the prot functions obtained in the standard Hotelling model. Therefore, we expect
that they will behave just like Hotelling duopolists.
Proof of Lemma 2
For jt  dlj 5 pl 5 t + dl + 2min fdf ; tg, the followers optimal choice depends on the
leaders discounted price. The followers prot under market sharing is greater than or equal
to that under monopolization if and only if
  Sf   Mf =
(t+ pl   dl)2
8t
  (pl   dl  min fdf ; tg)  0:
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Note that  is a convex quadratic function of z  pl   dl. Suppose rst that df  t (i.e.,
min fdf ; tg = t). Then, we have (z) = (t+z)
2
8t   (z   t)  0 with equality only when z = 3t.
In this case, the follower always chooses to share the market. Suppose next that df  t (i.e.,
min fdf ; tg = df ). Then, among the two solutions of equation (z) = (t+z)
2
8t   (z   df ) = 0,
the one that satises the condition pl  t+ dl + 2min fdf ; tg is z = 3t 
p
8t(t  df ). Thus,
the follower prefers market sharing to cornering if pl  dl  z = 3t 
p
8t(t  df ) for the case
of jt  dlj < dl + z.
Proof of Proposition 2
For the proof, it will su¢ ce to show that l and 

f at the market sharing equilibrium
with df  23t=32 are truly the maximal prots obtainable by the leader and the follower
respectively for all values of dl and df . First note that l is the leaders overall maximal prot
under market sharing since it is the unconstrained solution of its prot-maximization problem,
and the leader would obtain zero prot under monopolization. Next we show that the follower
cannot earn prots greater than f with df < 23t=32. Suppose that df < 23t=32. Then, the
constraint Sf  Mf in the leaders prot maximization problem will be binding, and di¤erent
equilibrium prices, denoted by (pl ; p

f ), will be obtained. Note from (6) that the constraint
Sf  Mf sets an upper bound on pl   dl. From (7), we know that the constraint is binding
at df = 23t=32, and in this case pl   dl = 3t2 . The binding constraint (i.e., Sf = Mf ) for
df < 23t=32 is given by pl   dl = 3t  
p
8t(t  df ). Since the upper bound is increasing in
df , it must be true that
pl   dl = 3t 
q
8t(t  df ) < 3t
2
= pl   dl
=) pl   dl < pl   dl:
From (4), we can see that Sf is increasing in pl   dl, independent of df . This implies that the
followers prot with (pl ; p

f ) cannot be larger than the equilibrium prot with (p

l ; p

f ) and
df  23t=32.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us rst consider the case of t < vA < 3t=2 = pl   dl, i.e. the case where the constraint
binds only for the leaders price. When discounts are large enough for the follower to decide
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to share the market, the equilibrium prices are given by
bpl = vA + dl
bpf = vA + t
2
+ df ;
and the corresponding prots are
bl = vA (3t  vA)
4t
;
bf = (vA + t)2
8t
:
By the same logic developed in the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, it is straight-
forward to show that both rms wish to commit to large brand-specic discounts. The logic
is that, since the followers prot is (weakly) increasing in the leaders e¤ective price, the fol-
lower wishes to commit to market sharing by choosing a high discount. The cut-o¤ value of
the followers discount ensuring market sharing is derived from condition (6) in Lemma 2 as
follows. The follower chooses to share the market if
bpl   dl  3t q8t(t  df );
which, after substituting bpl   dl = vA, reduces to
df  t  (3t  vA)
2
8t
:
Second, if vA < t, the follower is also constrained to an upper price limit of vA (bpf   df =
vA+t
2 > vA). Then the equilibrium prices and prots are given as
epi = vA + di;
ei = vA=2
for i = l; f . Given the leaders e¤ective price vA, the followers prot is vA=2 when sharing
the market and vA minfdf ; tg when monopolizing the market (see the proof of Lemma 2 for
details). Therefore, in order for the follower to choose market sharing in the pricing game, the
discount df should be greater than or equal to vA=2.
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